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 Poole, Bradley R. M.A. The University of Memphis. May/2011. “An Approach 
Integrating Deterrence and Rational Choice Theory.” Major Professor: Dr. K.B. Turner 
 
This study used an integrative theoretical approach.  Criminological theories 
(deterrence and rational choice) were utilized in the theoretical framework for this study.  
A massive literature review was included in this study to help connect the theories being 
integrated.  In the fall of 2010, approximately 505 students from the University of 
Memphis were used as the unit of analysis to examine their perceptions about offending, 
specifically, illegal parking.  The respondents were all given a questionnaire that was 
used to measure two essential components of deterrence theory: certainty and severity of 
punishment.  The questionnaire also asked the respondents about their perceptions of 
illegal parking issues on campus.  This component assisted the researcher in testing 
rational choice theory as students underwent a cost/benefit analysis.  Certainty and 
severity of punishment both proved to be factors that deterred the students from 
offending.  However, students’ perceptions about offending were not associated with 
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 There is a movement in contemporary criminology to better explain and predict 
crime by integrating certain theories.  Criminological theory provides a framework to 
guide a researcher to more accurate explanations and predictions of crime.  Critics of 
criminology are quick to point out that there has yet to be a theory that can explain and 
predict all crime (Clarke, 1980; Gibbs, 1987).  In fact, Edwin Sutherland, a pioneer of 
criminology, was often criticized by fellow sociologists for his emphasis on 
criminological theory.  However, criminological theory does have the potential to explain 
key principles of criminality.  The right approach must be discovered first. 
The goal of this research is to integrate two closely connected theories in an 
attempt to better explain certain types of crime (those unrelated to passion).  The theories 
that have been integrated in this study are derived from the classical school of 
criminological thought.  The classical school of criminology was based on the 
assumption that criminal activity can be deterred through formal sanctions associated 
with punishment.  Classical theorists considered the threat of punishment to be as much 
of a deterrent factor as actual punishment.   
This integrative study examines the application of deterrence and rational choice 
theory simultaneously.  Contemporary viewpoints are also applied in this study.  The 
overall goal, after full integration of deterrence and rational choice theory, is to share a 
new outlook on the classical school of criminology.  The theories themselves are not 
outdated; the theories have merely been associated with research that has cast a 






Paternoster, 1989) who are trying to use classical theories in different contexts compared 
to how researchers previously used the theories.   
This study will use deterrence and rational choice theory to test whether the 
certainty and severity of punishment will deter individuals from committing an illegal 
act, in this case, illegally parking.  Deterrence stems from society’s intolerance towards 
certain behavior (criminal).  Rational choice theory comes mostly from the concept of a 
cost/benefit analysis.  It is assumed that humans are rational thinkers who delve into a 
cost/benefit analysis before participating in most activities, including their involvement in 
illegal behavior.  For instance, before a person decides to purchase an item, he or she 
evaluates costs and benefits.  If an individual deems the item to be more beneficial to him 
or her than the cost of the item, it is worth purchasing the item.  There are exceptions, 
however, particularly when dealing with crimes of passion.  This fact is taken into 
consideration.  This research is beyond the scope of this instant to explain or predict 
crimes of passion.     
The use of illegal parking is not new to the examination of deterrence theory.  
Chambliss (1966) examined faculty violation of campus parking regulations.  The 
campus atmosphere before the study was carried out was defined as follows: the severity 
of punishment was incredibly low ($1) and the certainty of punishment was equally low 
(no means of regular enforcement).  After a new set of sanctions were implemented 
(more certainty and severity of punishment), 35% of those who had been illegally parking 
on a regular basis refrained from doing so after the sanctions changed.  Obviously, a level 






In this study, parking offenses at The University of Memphis are used to examine 
the conditions under which people are more likely to commit offenses.  This study also 
tests the effect of certainty and severity in accordance with deterrence theory.  After 
reviewing research on previous studies testing deterrence, it was found that celerity is not 
significant in regards to deterring individuals (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001).  In light of these 
findings, celerity will be omitted from this study.   
Research Questions 
This study is designed to address the following research questions:  does the 
severity of a penalty deter illegal parking, does having certainty of punishment deter 
illegal parking, does being punished deter students from recidivating and parking illegally 
in the future, does the level of urgency for getting a parking spot make a difference in the 
decision to illegally park, and is student classification a factor in violating rules and 
regulations?  Other factors considered in the analysis are gender, age, race, major, 
employment, residential status, and whether or not the student is a student athlete, and if 
so, for which sport.  It is a common assumption that some students are treated more 
favorably when it comes to receiving a parking ticket.  This controlling factor will allow 
for clarification as to the validity of that assumption.  As a final consideration, does an 
individual’s perceived likelihood of being caught matter in his or her decision to park 












The two theories that are examined in this study come from the classical school of 
thought: deterrence and rational choice.  According to Beccaria, crime occurs when the 
benefits of the crime outweigh the costs of committing a crime (as cited in Brown, 
Esbensen, & Geis, 2007).  This statement by Beccaria is often referred to as the main 
point of focus derived from the classical school.  Beccaria believed that the essence of 
crime was to harm society (Beccaria, 1764/1963).  Beccaria also stated that it is better to 
prevent crime than to punish crime (Beccaria, 1764/1963).  Deterrence was the 
prevention method that Beccaria discussed in his book On Crimes and Punishments.  The 
threat of punishment should be used to manipulate behavior.  There are three premises 
that must hold true in order for deterrence theory to have a solid framework.  First, people 
are rational.  Second, behavior is a product of an individual’s free will.  Lastly, people are 
hedonistic.   
 People who are rational use logic in their decision making process.  The goal of 
reaching pleasure, as well as avoiding pain, is central to an individual’s decision making 
processes.  Therefore, there is a cost/benefit analysis that often precedes action when an 
individual is thinking about committing a crime.  If the benefits outweigh the costs, an 
individual is more likely to offend than if the costs outweigh the benefits of committing a 
crime. 
 There are three principles of punishment that Beccaria noted as the trademark of 






manipulation of these elements were implemented, then crime could be prevented 
(Beccaria, 1764/1963).  If people do not believe in the negative consequences for 
violating a law, then they are less likely to conform to legal mandates of the law. 
 Research has seemed to indicate that the most important of the three principles is 
certainty, particularly when the level of certainty reaches a critical level (Rowe & Tittle, 
1974).  If the level of certainty of punishment decreases, then the probability of law 
violations will increase.  Severity is a major key principle as well.  One point that 
Beccaria makes is central to the current study.  Beccaria stated that the severity of 
punishment must be justifiable.  He further states, “For a punishment to attain its end, the 
evil which it inflicts has only to exceed the advantage derivable from the crime…. All 
beyond this is superfluous and for that reason tyrannical.” (Beccaria, 1764/1963)      
 There are two types of deterrence: general and specific.  General deterrence is the 
focus when punishment is designed to alter the behavior of individuals who are not the 
target of punishment.  The offender is used as an example of what could happen if other 
individuals choose to commit the crime.  Specific deterrence focuses on the specific 
person who committed a crime.  It is used to dissuade that person from committing future 
offenses.   
 Some contemporary criminologists (Cameron & O’Conner, 2002) have attempted 
to discredit classical deterrence theory.  Currently, the field of criminology is dominated 
by sociological perspectives about crime (Chicago School of Thought).  Labeling 
theorists are quick to dismiss deterrence theory.  Deterrence theory states that punishment 
diminishes crime.  On the contrary, labeling theory posits that punishment can increase 






correct or there is a medium to be achieved.  In contemporary deterrence research, the 
punishment fitting the crime is believed to be of vital importance.  Therefore, discrediting 
a theory on outdated preconceived notions may not achieve the best results.    
 Enrico Ferri (1901/1968), a positivist, stated that we have but to look within us to 
see that the criminal code is far from being a remedy against crime, that it remedies 
nothing.  Barnes and Teeters stated that the claim for deterrence is belied by both history 
and logic (as cited by Brown et al., 2007).  Reckless stated that deterrence does not 
prevent crime in others or prevent relapse into crime (as cited by Brown et al., 2007).   
 Another criticism of deterrence theory concerns the large number of people who 
are in prison for the third, fourth, or nth times.  Recidivists seemingly demonstrate that 
deterrence alone did not work.  However, deterrence cannot be totally disregarded as a 
theory because there may be just as many cases in which deterrence has worked.  If a 
driver received a ticket on a certain road, the next time the driver is on that road he or she 
is less likely to speed.  The driver will be more conscientious about speeding to avoid 
potential punishment.  
 Since deterrence is not easily observed, it is equally difficult to measure.  Critics 
point to the people who are getting into trouble or have gotten into trouble.  This is 
measureable.  However, these theorists do not think about all the people who have not 
committed a crime or those who have committed a crime and have been punished once 
and did not recidivate.  It is more challenging to measure whether deterrence was at work 
when deciding to commit a crime, or not commit a crime, than it is to measure some of 
the other criminological factors (socioeconomic variables and prior criminal history).  






absolutely working.  There would have to be a complete absence of crime.  This 
utilitarian view is flawed.  Therefore, critics should be not so quick to discard deterrence 
theory.  Deterrence theory, when applied correctly, can be an effective tool in preventing 
crime.  Since there is no way to get rid of crime, we must try to curb crime.  It is known 
that certainty and severity of punishment deter some crime (Paternoster, 1987).  
Therefore, deterrence theory is useful.  
 There are also believers in rehabilitation who think that it should be the main 
focal point of reducing crime.  However, Robert Martinson’s (1975) summary of research 
became the driving factor of a strong anti-rehabilitation movement.  Martinson’s findings 
were summed up by this paragraph.   
We know almost nothing about the “deterrent effect,” largely because “treatment” 
theories have so dominated our research, and “deterrence” theories have been 
relegated almost to the status of a historical curiosity.  Since we have almost no 
idea of the deterrent functions that our present system performs or that future 
strategies might be made to perform, it is possible that there is indeed something 
that works – that to some extent is working right now in front of our noses, and 
that might be made to work better – something that deters rather than cures, 
something that does not so much reform convicted offenders as prevent criminal 
behavior in the first place. (Martinson, Kreager, Huizinga, 1975, p. 224)   
Deterrence theory should be given another try.  However, this time it should be 
applied as it was originally intended to be used by Beccaria.  The punishment should fit 
the crime.  There should be an stronger emphasis on crime prevention as Baccaria stated 







Rational choice ties in with deterrence theory very nicely.  Perceptions of the 
probability of punishment are analyzed in this theory.  An individual’s perception of 
anything, whether correct or not, is a driving factor that influences his or her actions.  
According to W. I. Thomas, “Individuals differentiated in what ways and placed in what 
situations react in what patterns of behavior, and what behavioral changes in situations?” 
(as cited by Timasheff, 1967, p. 178).  Thomas also stated, “The behavior in the situation, 
the changes brought about in the situation, and the resulting change in behavior represent 
the nearest approach the social scientist is able to make to the use of experiment in social 
research…”  Thomas was known for his research concerning individuals’ perceptions in 
association with decision making.  
Rational choice theory expands on deterrence theory in many ways.  Also, the 
choices of potential offenders are considered as well as the choices of victims.  Rational 
choice assumes that rationality is the driving factor in the decision making process.  
Rational choice theory is pertinent to victims of crimes as well.  Willits and Wadsworth 
(2007) presented a paper that examined convenience store robberies between 1998 and 
2005 in the state of New Mexico.  Over 1,500 police reports were used to better 
understand offender and victim decision making processes.  The narrative of the incident 
reports were helpful to the researchers in obtaining pertinent offender and victim actions 
that were associated with “success and failure.”   
There have been more variables incorporated when researching rational choice 
theory than there were with deterrence theory.  This is probably due to the fact that 






choice theory.  Individuals choose what type of crime to commit based on many factors.  
Planning starts to play a huge role in offending when rational choice theory is examined.   
Rational choice is becoming one of the most researched theoretical premises.  
Michael Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa (1997) found that in 1957 there were zero 
articles published in the American Political Science Review that utilized rational choice 
theory.  However, in 1992, nearly 40% of all articles published in American Political 
Science Review used rational choice theory in some form or another. 
Herrnstein (1990) stated that rational choice theory remains unequaled as a 
normative theory.  Thus, all academic disciplines dealing with behavior increasingly rely 
on the idea that humans tend to maximize utility.  Many areas of study within 
criminology have been formed by using the rational choice theory.  Victimization, 
defensible space designs, crime displacement, hot spots, and routine activities have all 
been researched with the assistance of rational choice theory.  Every action is met with 
the perceived reaction that the individual will have to deal with.  It is the perceived act 
versus the perceived consequence that determines one’s cost/benefit analysis, not the 
actual act versus the actual consequence. 
Crime prevention is a relatively new term in the realm of criminology.  Rational 
choice theory is deeply embedded in the roots of all research associated with crime 
prevention and crime control policies.  Cornish and Clarke (1987) examine this dynamic 
by developing the concept of “choice-structuring properties.”  Choice-structuring 
properties include opportunities, costs, and benefits.  The analysis of crime displacement 






Boudon (1998) wrote an article incorporating some of the researched limitations 
of rational choice theory.  Here is an example: One of the main benefits of rational choice 
theory is “rational action is its own explanation.”  However, some would argue that 
actions are not rational.  A postulate in rational choice theory is that individual action is 
instrumental.  Boudon goes on to say that many sociologists have researched and found 
that all individual action is not instrumental.  Boudon offers his solution to this criticism: 
One may promote the generality of Rational Choice Theory by supposing that 
actions that appear to be noninstrumental are actually instrumental at a deeper 
level. This conversion from noninstrumental to instrumental is obtained by 
introducing the postulate that, contrary to appearances, beliefs are the product of 


















Analysis of Perceived Danger 
A study by McCarthy and Hagan (2005) examined danger.  Specifically, their 
study looked at the role that perceptions about danger played in association with 
involvement in theft, drug selling, and prostitution among homeless youth.  The 
hypothesis in McCarthy and Hagan’s study said that perceptions of crime’s potential 
danger influence offending.  A large portion of victims of crime fight back against their 
assailants.  Some offenders often did not commit a crime due to fear of physical harm 
being done to them.  Conversely, some offenders said that they committed the crimes 
because they did not feel as if their victim posed any danger to them at all.  In accordance 
with deterrence theory, the violence that sometimes ensues during a crime can be more 
certain, severe, and swift than the actual legal sanctions for committing the crime in the 
first place.  The researchers in this study argue that some people incorrectly included 
many factors about committing a crime in the same cost/benefit analysis.  McCarthy and 
Hagan said that the perception of danger is a different analysis altogether when compared 
to the perceptions about a crime’s excitement, profit, or other considerations.   
This was not a new idea.  A classicist by the name of Jeremy Bentham said that 
danger played an important role in the “hedonistic calculus” people use in making 
decisions (McCarthy & Hagan, 2005).  Bentham said that danger is nothing but the 
chance of pain (Bentham, 1789/1996, p. 144).  Also, researchers have to consider that not 
all cultures have the same outlook on pleasure and pain.  However, physical harm may be 






undesirable (Jaeger, 2001, p.88).  In virtually all societies, physical harm to any human 
being is seen as a negative action. 
 McCarthy and Hagan’s (2005) study differs from many other related studies 
because they do not use arrest, incarceration, other state penalties, or other formal 
sanctions as measurement tools for perceptions of a crime’s cost.  However, when 
economic and social marginalization minimize a person’s ties to normative society and 
can encourage the view that crime is a legitimate means for meeting someone’s goal 
(McCarthy & Hagan, 2005), formal sanctions do not have as high of an impact because 
these individuals do not have a social stigma to avoid.  Therefore, the threat of danger 
may be the only thing preventing some types of offenders from committing a crime. 
 McCarthy and Hagan took data from a study of Toronto and Vancouver, Canada, 
street youth in 1992.  The respondents all came from different types of service agencies 
and street locations where the homeless are often found.  Four hundred and eighty-two 
youth filled out a self-report questionnaire.  There were three waves of data, with only 
53% completing all three waves.  The independent variable was the perceived danger of 
various crimes.  One of the cost variables measured the perceptions of the likelihood of 
formal sanctions for an offense.  Another cost variable asked for perceptions about the 
unacceptability of particular crimes.  Also, the perceived potential return from a crime 
was asked.  There were a large variety of control variables including family background, 
parental unemployment, and maternal drug addiction.  There were three dependent 
variables: frequency of committing theft, drug selling since leaving home, and number of 






 The results confirmed the author’s expectations (a rational choice approach was 
taken in regards to most of the crimes).  There were many examples of accounts of 
physical hazards of offending.  Victim retribution was a common theme, especially with 
theft crimes.  Some offenders even mentioned other perceived physical threats that had 
nothing to do with people.  Some offenders brought up dogs and their fear of being bitten.  
Police brutality seemed to be a deterrent as well.  Some offenders reported being attacked 
by their own clients, especially those who sold sex.   
 It was clear by these researchers’ findings that a rational choice approach was 
taken by offenders when deciding on whether or not to commit a crime.  Perceived costs 
and benefits are analyzed by offenders before they commit themselves to illegal activity.  
Danger and physical harm were also considered when offenders were thinking about 
committing a crime.  
 These researchers clearly highlighted the value of perception in relationship to a 
cost/benefit analysis.  Danger means different things to different people.  Thus, the 
analysis will be different for everyone.  However, there is one constant.  An analysis will 
take place during these types of crime.  The next research topic looks at two postulates of 
deterrence theory, certainty and severity. 
Threat of Punishment: Likelihood or Severity? 
 A study by Cook (1980) examined three questions.  First, what factors influence 
the rate at which active criminals commit crimes?  Second, which dimension of the threat 
of punishment has a greater deterrent effect- likelihood or severity?  Lastly, what effect 







 As Cook (1980) stated, “The core concern of deterrence research has been to 
develop a scientific understanding of the relationship between the crime rate and the 
threat of punishment generated by the criminal justice system.”  Cook made a good 
argument in trying to combat deterrence critics.  Critics are quick to discount deterrence 
theory because they believe the criminal justice system has little impact on crime rates.  If 
that is in fact true, why do we not just do away with the police and eliminate all illegal 
sanctions?  One might say that crime would be rampant.  Therefore, there is a deterrence 
effect.  The question should not be if deterrence has an effect, but what is the effect 
deterrence plays in society?  Deterrence has a role to play, whether formally or not. 
 There is one general consensus in society when talking about criminals.  Most 
people do want to see criminals punished.  The question is to what degree should they be 
punished as appropriateness dictates?  This question is greatly hindered by yet another 
question.  How do we accurately assess the marginal deterrent effects of changes in the 
certainty and severity of the punishment?  This factor is not easily measured or accounted 
for in research. 
 There was one study of New York City subways in which large increases in 
police patrol activity were effective in reducing robberies (Chaiken, Lawless, & 
Stevenson, 1974).  The increase in the likelihood of arrest for attempted airline hijacking 
that resulted from the airport security measures adopted in 1973 almost eliminated this 
type of crime (Landes, 1978). 
 Cook (1980) talked about a rational potential criminal.  He said that an increase in 
the probability or severity of punishment for a particular type of crime, or both, will 






criminals will weigh in a cost benefit analysis, and take advantage of a criminal 
opportunity only if it is in their best interest to do so.  If their perception of the benefits 
and costs of committing a crime are unfavorable to them, then they will abstain from 
committing the illegal act in question. 
 Cook (1980) looked at reasons why individuals responded differently to 
equivalent criminal opportunities.  Individuals differ in their willingness to accept risks.  
Individuals differ with respect to “honesty preference”- the strength of their preference 
for behaving in a law-abiding manner.  Individuals differ with respect to their evaluation 
of the “profit” to be gained from a crime.  Individuals differ in their objective 
circumstances: their income, the value they place on their time, their skills in committing 
crimes successfully and evading capture, and their reputation in the community.  All of 
these factors are valued differently by individual persons.  Therefore, the issue becomes a 
little more complex. 
 Cook (1980) examined the visible presence of enforcers.  He said, “The proximity 
of police emits a potent signal that the probability of arrest for a crime committed in the 
immediate vicinity is high” (p. 223).  Cook talked about the effects that security guards 
have on deterring would-be robbers.  When the chance of apprehension increases the 
likelihood of offense decreases.   
 Cook (1979) developed a model that simulated the criminal behavior of a 
population of robbers.  There were three main features of this model.  First, at any time, a 
robber’s perception of arrest and punishment is influenced by his own recent experience 
and that of a few “friends.”  If his and his “friend’s” recent experiences went well, then 






more amenable to him.  Second, even if the true effectiveness of the system remains 
constant, there is considerable turnover among active robbers: robbers are deterred and 
“undeterred” according to their own experiences and those of their friends.  Lastly, an 
increase in the true effectiveness of the system results in a corresponding increase in the 
mean of robbers’ perceptions of effectiveness, and an increase in the number of robbers 
who are deterred. 
 Cook (1979) describes the vast majority of the criminal population as 
opportunistic with respect to property crimes.  Individuals see an advantage point and 
make the best of it.  The key is to try to eliminate as many of the opportunities for 
criminality as possible.  There were two limiting factors derived from Cook’s study: the 
opportunity cost of time and the effects of increased income on the willingness to take 
risks.  CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) is derived from these 
principles.   
 Cook’s (1979) study was a massive literature review in which he focused on 
deterrence and rational choice studies.  He analyzed the findings from all the studies and 
gave critiques where he thought the studies could have been improved.  His conclusions 
derived from all of the sources studied gave him basis for his ideas on threat of 
punishment.   
 These researchers examined certainty and severity of punishment to gauge which 
is more important.  Cook’s (1979) research suggested that when offenders have a 
heightened since of certainty of punishment, the likelihood of offending drops 







The Revival of Deterrence: General Prevention 
 A study by Andenaes (1975) reviewed literature to describe a revitalized approach 
in deterrence theory.  Andenaes talked about how for many years deterrence theory was 
not highly thought of in the field of criminology.  In the middle of the 1960s there was a 
massive amount of literature published that gave a slightly different outlook on 
deterrence theory.  This research implied that maybe deterrence theory should be 
revisited in the search of explaining and predicting crime. 
 For the greater part of the twentieth century, rehabilitation and treatment have 
been the dominant approach in criminology.  Andenaes points out that these approaches 
were just wishful thinking.  We have yet to find a way to rehabilitate offenders.  
Treatment has made very little difference in the rate of recidivism.  We do not know what 
the proper time frame is to release an offender so that he or she does not recidivate.  Also, 
many people point to the fact that once humans are grown they are set in their ways, both 
positive and negative.  Therefore, some people view rehabilitation as a waste of time and 
money.  These people believe that if children are not prevented from being criminal then 
they will never really be “fixed” as an adult.  Also, some believe that there is an “aging 
out of crime” process that takes place.  The problem with this notion is that the damage is 
already done.   
 For many, deterrence theory has always had such a negative connotation to it.  
Whenever people hear the word deterrence, they automatically think of harsh 
punishment.  Deterrence has been chastised as being primitive and brutal.  However, 
deterrence is not so simplistic.  The threat of punishment can be just as big of a factor in a 






questions.  How much new insight have we gained?  How useful is this insight for 
purposes of criminal policy? 
 Economists have been the driving force behind the new deterrence approach.  
They have added two aspects to the field.  First, the economists assume that crime is the 
outcome of a rational choice.  They believe that the reduction of crime would follow an 
increase in the costs of crime.  Secondly, economists have used an application of non-
experimental, statistical models and methods. 
 General deterrence theory has always been associated with three principles, 
certainty, severity, and celerity.  In this study by Andenaes (1975), there is a new 
principle entertained.  The perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system and of the 
particular statute under examination is said to be a factor in criminality as well.  This new 
“fourth deterrence principle” may be the most important yet. 
 Andenaes (1975) hammered home the concept of the threat of punishment instead 
of actual punishment.  He said, “If the threat itself is 100 per cent effective, there will be 
no violation” (p. 342).  He said that deterrence theory should not be discredited on a 
simple usage of inaccurate terminology.  
 Andenaes (1975) talked about the problems with “change in legislation” research.  
These are studies that have to be comparisons over time.  The studies are a sort of before 
and after research design.  First, it is difficult to identify the impact of the change among 
all the other factors which have been involved at the same time.  Secondly, there is a 
huge amount of crime that is simply not reported.  The usage of victimization studies 






this but it is still relatively new to research and should allow for much higher 
“generalizability” of research findings in the future.  
 Andenaes (1975) said that survey research was a good way to measure general 
prevention.  Collecting data on public perceptions and beliefs about the criminal justice 
system seemed to be a sensible way to measure the effect of the threat of punishment.  
Andenaes talked about one of the best known studies on public awareness by Miller et al. 
(1971).  The level of awareness in the general population concerning the maximum 
penalties for different crimes was very low.  If penalties are to deter, we must assume that 
members of society know what the penalties are (Miller et al., 1971).  If the knowledge of 
the penalties is poor, deterrence cannot work. 
 These researchers show a new outlook on deterrence theory.  There was some 
research unfavorable to the classical school of criminology.  This led to an increase in the 
rehabilitation movement in criminology.  However, the research associated with this 
movement has been negative as well.  Therefore, it is only fair that classical theories be 
reexamined and be made applicable again.  The next section of research examines choice.  
To offend or not to offend, that is the question.   
Deterrence and the Rational Choice Model: Imperfectly Informed Choice 
 Paternoster’s (1989) study began with an overview of deterrence theory’s three 
propositions: certainty, severity, and celerity.  Paternoster criticized classic and 
contemporary deterrence theorists for not specifying the specific offending decisions that 







 Paternoster (1989) stated that the problem lies in the fact that deterrence 
researchers have not recognized that persons make several kinds of offending decisions 
that may be differentially affected by a given set of explanatory factors.  The decision to 
participate in a crime comes first.  Paternoster said that deterrence researchers have to 
determine the effect of sanction threats for a group of people.  Also, why do some 
commit an offense and others do not during a given period of time?  The decision to 
participate or not is measurable.  Some call this the “prevalence of involvement” 
(Blumstein & Graddy, 1982).  Studying non criminals may lead to important information 
that we are missing.   
 Paternoster (1989) referred to potential offenders who have previously not 
offended and those who have already committed an offense.  Deciding whether to offend 
or not is the focal point.  This is called a current participation decision.  There are those 
with no previous offense history who decide to offend for the first time.  This is called an 
initial participation decision.  The next decision concerned whether or not a person 
repeats offending.  This is called a continuation decision.  This continuation decision is 
what drives all of the research based on why people recidivate. 
 Paternoster (1989) explained the rational choice model of offending in this way.  
People make conscious decisions to offend based upon information about offenses and 
decisions which have outcomes they believe will be beneficial or profitable to them.  The 
problem is that people are not making an informed choice.  If their perceived calculation 
in their cost/benefit analysis is wrong, then their conclusion derived from the analysis 






 There are several background factors that could potentially influence the decision 
to offend.  The strength of affective ties is one factor.  Another factor is the cost of 
material deprivations or investments made in conformity.  Supportive social groups and 
opportunities for offending play a role.  Informal social costs and perceptions of formal 
legal sanctions can also sway the decision to offend.  Lastly, moral beliefs about the 
appropriateness of such actions can be a factor. 
 Paternoster (1989) said that there are other features of the rational choice model 
that should be noted.  First, it is assumed that although all offending is based upon 
informed choice, the specific informational factors that affect such decisions vary by 
offense.  Secondly, it is assumed that the magnitude of the effect for each of the factors 
may be different not only for different offenses but also for different types of offending 
decisions.  Lastly, although each of the specified explanatory factors is presumed to 
affect the participation decision at different levels, it cannot be specified in advance 
which factors most strongly affect which decisions and each decision must be separately 
modeled. 
 The data for this study came from students who were attending nine public high 
schools in and around a mid-sized southeastern city.  Confidential questionnaires were 
administered to all 10th grade students at the beginning of the 1981-1982 school year.  
Over 99 % of the 2,700 students agreed to participate.  A follow-up questionnaire was 
given to the same students on two subsequent occasions: once their junior year and once 
their senior year.  Forty-six percent of the students completed all three years of 






 The independent variables were categorized into seven different areas of a 
rational choice perspective: background factors, affective ties, material considerations, 
opportunities, informal sanctions, formal sanctions, and moral beliefs.  The dependent 
variables were the student’s involvement in four common delinquent offenses: marijuana 
use, underage drinking, theft, and vandalism. 
 There was one clear finding from the study.  The decision to offend for the first 
time is unrelated to the effect of perceived certainty and severity of punishment.  Those 
who were more likely to participate in the four delinquent acts were males who have 
weaker moral inhibitions against offending, males who experience lax parental 
supervision, and males who were more likely to socialize with peers than those who 
continued to abstain. 
 There were only two variables that had a significant effect on three of the four 
offenses: gender and parental supervision.  The decision to drink liquor under age was 
affected by opportunity considerations: social activities, parental supervision, and peer 
sanctions.  However opportunity factors did not have an effect on the two forms of 
opportunity factors. 
 Marijuana use and vandalism were consistent with the deterrence doctrine.  A 
change in perceived certainty was significantly related to the decision to desist from 
offending for vandalism.  Changes in moral tolerance of an act were associated with the 
decision to quit offending. 
 Paternoster made three assumptions to try to explain his findings.  First, the 
juvenile justice system is generally lenient in the imposition of meaningful sanctions on 






which these youths could reasonably expect would not carry heavy sanctions even if they 
were arrested.  Lastly, the deterrent effect of formal legal sanctions may be dwarfed by 
the “nonlegal” consequences of apprehension and arrest and by such considerations as 
moral beliefs.    
 These researchers make an important distinction involving choice.  People do 
make choices based on information.  However, the information is not always accurate 
and is sometimes biased.  This leads to a decision being made that has a higher chance of 
error or mistake.  The next section of research examines a rational choice diagram. 
Perceived Risk and the Rational Choice Model 
A study by Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga (2006) looked at the perceived risks 
of committing crimes.  An important subjective cost of crime is the perceived risk of 
formal sanction.  The question is do individuals with higher perceptions of the risk of 
punishment commit fewer criminal acts? 
 Some research suggested that perceived rewards dominate costs in criminal 
decision making, presumably because criminals discount formal punishment due to its 
long time horizon (Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, & Matsueda, 1986).  Rational choice 
theory assumes that risk perceptions are rooted, at least to some degree, in reality. 
 Matsueda et al. (2006) used a Bayesian learning model in this study.  It is based 
on Bayes’ probability theorem.  This theory states that individuals begin with a prior 
subjective probability of an event, such as the risk of arrest, based on all the information 
they have accumulated to that point.  New information is then collected.  This new 
information is used to update their probability estimates.  This is called the posterior 






 Matsueda et al. (2006) specified three sources of information from which 
individuals update their perceptions of risk of arrest.  Some sources of information come 
from their own experiences with offending, including getting arrested and avoiding 
arrest.  Their knowledge of friends’ experiences with offending would be another source.  
Lastly, their social structural location can be a source.  For example, different 
socioeconomic groups may not share the same collective efficacy or perception for 
particular crimes. 
 The first hypothesis in this study had to do with prior perceived risk.  Future 
perceived risk is a positive function of prior perceived risk plus any updating.  Another 
hypothesis had to do with Bayesian learning based on personal experience with arrest.  
Net of prior risk, experienced certainty of arrest is positively and monotonically 
associated with perceived risk of arrest.  Hypothesis 3 had to do with the Bayesian 
learning based on personal experience with crime.  Unsanctioned offenses are negatively 
and monotonically associated with perceived risk of arrest.  Hypothesis 4 had to do with 
the shell of illusion.  Compared to experienced offenders, naïve individuals overestimate 
the risk of arrest.  Hypothesis 5 had to do with Bayesian learning based on vicarious 
experience.  Delinquent peers are negatively associated with perceived risk of arrest.  The 
sixth hypothesis had to do with social structure and perceived risk.  Perceived risk is 
shaped by location in the social structure.  Hypothesis 7 had to do with deterrence.  Crime 
is reduced by perceptions of greater risk of formal sanction weighted by perceived utility 
of the sanction.  Hypothesis 8 had to do with opportunity costs.  Crime is reduced by 
opportunity costs, including schooling and work.  Hypothesis 9 had to do with psychic 






excitement and social status from crime weighted by perceived utility of the excitement 
or status.  Hypothesis 10 had to do with criminal opportunities.  Criminal behavior is 
increased by perceptions of opportunities to get away with crime.  Hypothesis 11 had to 
do with limited rationality and discounting.  Criminal behavior is associated with 
perceptions of immediate criminal opportunities and rewards, but not by perceptions of 
future punishment.  The last hypothesis had to do with instrumental versus expressive 
crimes.  Rational choice and deterrence have stronger effects on theft than violence. 
 The data came from the Denver Youth Survey.  The total sample included 1,459 
respondents.  Risks, returns, and opportunities were measured from the youth reports.  
There were two variables measured with the respect to perceived risk of arrest: 
experienced certainty and unsanctioned offenses. 
 On average, females believed the chances of arrest for theft were 11% higher than 
males did.  Each year of age was associated with a decrease of 4% in perceived risk for 
theft and 1% for violence.  Youth with siblings perceived a lower risk of arrest for 
violence. 
 On average, as unsanctioned offenses increased, certainty of arrest declined.  
Compared to naïve offenders, high offenders (10 or more offenses) perceived the risk of 
arrest for violence about 10% lower.  Delinquency by peers was associated with lower 
perceptions of certainty of arrest. 
 Males and high impulsive individuals engaged in more theft and violence.  Older 
youth reported more violence.  Blacks engaged in more violence but not theft.  Prior 
violence and theft exerted strong lagged effects on future violence and theft.  Youth who 






 In conclusion, Matsueda et al. (2006) found support for deterrence and a rational 
choice model.  When dealing with crimes unrelated to passion, the rational choice model 
seemed to prevail.  Furthermore, Matsueda et al. said that they believe that the rational 
choice model could be complementary to any institutional theories.  This notion further 
fuels the progression of criminology into integrating theories to better explain and predict 








































Matsueda et al. (2006) used a Bayesian method of analysis to describe an 
individual’s cost/benefit analysis.  The chart above is an example of how many factors 
help influence someone’s decision making process over a given time.  Special attention 
should be given to the perceived risk portion of the chart.  This perceived risk is 
commonly updated to create an updated perceived risk.  This shows the cost/benefit 
analysis changing literally to the very second of committing a criminal act.  The next 
section of research examines a rational choice approach in accordance with curbing 
airline hijackings.  
A Rational Choice Model: Airline Hijackings 
 A study by Dugan et al. (2005) looked at attempted hijackings that occurred 
around the world.  The researchers used continuous-time analysis to estimate the impact 
of many counter hijacking interventions.  The analysis included different ways in which 
the offenders were motivated.  Regression analysis was used to show some of the 
predictors of successful hijackings. 
 A rational choice model was used to guide their research questions.  The 
researchers wanted to know if the hazard (risk) of a new hijacking attempt increases or 
decreases when the certainty of apprehension was increased.  Will the hazard of new 
hijacking attempts increase shortly after earlier attempts?  Will the hazard of new 
hijacking attempts be greater following a series of successful hijackings? 
 The data in this study came from United States and foreign countries’ airports 
from 1931 through 2003.  Supplemental data were also added by an additional 39 
hijacking cases that were identified from publicly available data from RAND.  The 






 After the metal detectors were implemented, hijacking attempts went down, 
except for those related to terrorism.  The hazard for another hijacking decreased 
significantly if the current and previous hijackings were attempted in a short period of 
time.  If the three most recent events were primarily successful and close together, the 
hazard of a new hijacking attempt increased for the full sample as well as for the non-
United States and non-terrorist hijackings. 
 The hazard of hijacking decreased substantially after this policy was enacted for 
both Cuban and United States’ flights.  Nearly three out of five flights diverted to Cuba 
originated from the United States.   
 Policies and stricter punishment seemed to have an effect on hijackers, except 
those with terrorist ideals.  If the certainty of apprehension was increased, the chance of 
another hijacking attempt went down.  The rate of hijacking went up significantly 
following a series of successful hijackings but declined following a series of unsuccessful 
hijacking attempts.  Metal detectors and increased surveillance significantly reduced the 
number of non terrorist related hijacking attempts. 
 One limitation in this study was the fact that the offenders’ motivations were not 
known in all the cases.  These motivations would have been useful to know because how 
the offenders viewed the policy changes could have been a factor in their reasoning for 
committing the act or not.  Also, with the policies changing at about the same time, it 
makes it hard to tell which had the largest deterrent effect.   
This research discusses some of the methods used by airlines to decrease 






the airlines increase the certainty of hijack detection, the attempts decrease.  The next 
section of research examines offenders’ decision making. 
A Rational Choice Model: Offenders’ Decisions 
 A study by Clarke and Cornish (1985) said that criminal behavior is the outcome 
of an offender’s rational choices and decisions.  When this approach was utilized, it had 
the most immediate payoff for crime control efforts aimed at reducing criminal 
opportunity.  Clarke and Cornish chastise theorists who choose to ignore the offender’s 
decision making. 
 According to Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973), a social theory must have 
reference to men’s teleology – their purposes, their beliefs and the context in which they 
act out these purposes and beliefs.  Thus men rob banks because they believe they may 
enrich themselves, not because something biologically propels them through the door. 
 Residential burglary was studied in relationship to the opportunity structure for 
crime in a study by Cohen and Felson (1979).  As the increased probability for electronic 
goods went up, so did the increases in burglary.  Also, the increase in numbers of 
unoccupied houses increased the number of burglaries.  When the opportunity went up, 
so did the criminal act. 
 The economists believe that it is the importance of the concepts of rewards and 
costs and their associated probabilities that are the most essential key in explaining 
criminal behavior.  This economic rationale is also said to be a good explanatory weapon 
for the phenomena of displacement and recidivism. 
 The view of economists is one that says criminals are “deterrable.”  Economists 






feel that committing the crime is not worth the trouble.  Unemployment is said to be a 
huge factor in crime.  If people are less likely to have money, then they are more likely to 
innovate illegal means of making their money. 
 Some psychological studies have shown that even professionals sometimes do not 
handle information perfectly at all times to make the best rational decision (Wilkins & 
Chandler, 1965).  If professionals who are knowledgeable in their own field of study do 
not always make the best decisions, then it is logical to infer that people sometimes do 
not make the best decisions. 
 Clarke and Cornish (1985) said that there are two fundamental aspects of crime 
that must be contemplated: explaining the involvement of particular individuals in crime 
and explaining the occurrence of criminal events.  Explaining the occurrence has been 
somewhat neglected in criminological research. 
 When looking at crime through a rational choice perspective, the distinctions 
between the two aspects of crime have to be made and analyzed separately.  For some 
offenses, like shoplifting, it might be easier to regard the first offense as determined by 
the multiple factors identified in criminological theory. 
 Clarke and Cornish (1985) also talk about the need for rational choice models to 
be specific to individual crimes.  As long as criminologists try to explain crime in a 
general way, they will get a general answer.  Burglary, for example, should be divided 
into two different types: residential and commercial.  The crimes may seem similar.  
However, there are different factors that can contribute to the potential attempt for each 






 The 1985 study by Clarke and Cornish was an in-depth qualitative review of a 
massive amount of research.  Rational choice was examined in great detail.  The authors 
tried to better define different types of rational choice models.  The importance of this 
study is great due to the fact that rational choice is not a general approach in criminology.  
There are specific models that work for specific types of criminal behavior.       
 Rational choice theory is used again to observe offenders’ decision making.  
Clarke and Cornish (1985) pay special attention to specific types of crimes.  There is no 
cost/benefit analysis that is uniform in structure.  The analyses differ between offender 
type and crime type.  The next section examines deterrence theory and what deters 
criminals.  
Restrictive Deterrence: NARC Identification 
 A study by Jacobs (1996) examined restrictive deterrence.  Active street-level 
crack dealers were interviewed in field research.  Dealers used perceived shorthand to 
determine whether buyers in question were “narcs.”  This study demonstrated how 
interactions among marketplace democratization, marketplace volatility, transactional 
brevity, and threats from law enforcement affect its complexity and refinement.   
 There is a strong case in this study for deterrence being a heavy influencer of a 
decision to commit a crime or not commit a crime.  The researchers wanted to know what 
“red flags” do crack dealers look for when they are attempting to find a buyer?  What are 
some of the “red flags” that give police away to the crack dealers?  What are some of the 







 The data gathered in this study came from interviews from forty active street 
dealers of crack cocaine who were working out of a medium-sized Midwestern 
metropolitan area within a central city with a population of 390,000.  Respondents, on 
average, did not sell very large amounts of crack.  The average crack sale was $20.  The 
average monthly gross income for the respondents was $2,300.  Respondents averaged 
selling crack about 5.5 days a week.  The estimated number of sales per day per dealer 
was about 20.  All respondents except four were unemployed.  Their average grade 
completed in school was tenth grade.  Thirty three respondents reported that they lived 
with relatives.  Seven lived with friends.  Thirty four were male.  Six were female.  All 
respondents were African-American.  Their average age was a little over 20.  All of the 
male respondents were active gang members.  They all sold for personal profit and did 
not seem to be involved in any type of a “drug gang ring.”  Interviews were set up in a 
semi-structured format which allowed for further probing if needed. 
 A snowball sample was formed.  The first five respondents were recruited by the 
researcher himself.  Four out of those five became contacts and provided six additional 
respondents.  Contacts were paid $20 for each referral they made.  There were criteria 
that each respondent had to meet to be involved in the study.  The respondents had to 
have “trafficked” at least 4 hours a day, several days a week, for at least six months, to 
several different customers per day, and grossed at least $1,300 per month. 
 One technique that the crack dealers used to differentiate the police from 
“legitimate” buyers was asking them to inhale crack smoke through a pipe.  Another way 
was to give a smaller rock than paid for.  The respondents said that true crack heads 






unwilling to taste the crack by placing it on their tongues.  Another way the dealers 
would use would be asking them who they knew in the neighborhood. 
 Most of the crack dealers were users as well.  The ones who had been caught by 
police in the past were the ones who had such an addiction that they did not even care to 
really examine buyers before selling.  For other dealers, if buyers did not fit the “right 
appearance,” then they were not sold to even if they were not police.  In some cases, 
dealers reduced offense frequencies at the cost of withdrawing into their own 
transactional circles. 
 One thing remained fairly consistent throughout the study.  Crack dealers did not 
want to be caught.  This shows strong support for deterrence and rational choice.  Using a 
cost/benefit analysis, crack dealers were fully aware of what they were doing.  It was 
illegal, and they tried to refrain from being caught and punished.  They screened potential 
buyers and in some cases tested potential buyers. 
 This study examined some of the ways that drug offenders pick up on “narcs.”  
This research is relevant in criminological circles in two ways.  First, it is helpful for 
police to know about these techniques used by criminals to screen “narcs.”  Secondly, 
this research proves that deterrence theory is at work with these criminals.  These 
criminals speak of being deterred several times from offending.  The common thread 











 This study used a quantitative approach to gather primary data.  The unit of 
analysis was individual University of Memphis students.  This was the one and only 
qualifier/disqualifier.  If a person was not a student at the University of Memphis during 
this study, then he or she was not eligible to participate in this study.  This study was 
approved by the University of Memphis Institutional Review Board.   
After consulting with numerous professors from the University of Memphis 
Departments of Criminology and Criminal Justice and English, the target goal for the 
sample size was 400.  Those two particular departments were chosen because they have a 
good cross section of the university’s students.  Because the sample in this study was not 
randomly chosen, the researcher tried to get more respondents to help with the 
generalizability towards this group, at this time, and at this place.  The final sample size 
was 505. 
A non-probability convenience sample was used to gather participants.  
Professors were chosen at the convenience of the researcher and were asked if the 
questionnaire could be administered in their class.  After a professor agreed to let his or 
her students participate in the study, a time was selected within the first month of the Fall 
2010 semester by the researcher and professor for survey distribution.  The consent form 
was explained to all the students prior to the distribution of the survey.  The students 
were told that participation was voluntary and that all results would remain completely 
anonymous.  Students were asked if they had taken the survey in a previous class.  If they 






questionnaires were handed out in person to help maintain the questionnaire’s integrity.  
After the students finished the questionnaire, they passed the surveys to the front of the 
class where they were collected.  The estimated response rate was 99%.  Individuals who 
responded by saying they were not at least 18 years old were not included in the analysis.  
There were approximately five surveys discarded for this reason.   
Variables 
The variables employed in this study operationalized deterrence and rational 
choice theory.  Some of the questions on the questionnaire were more about an 
individual’s perception of decision making than an actual decision being made.  For 
example, one question asked, “What do you perceive the chances are of you receiving a 
ticket for parking illegally at the University of Memphis?”  This question is not actually 
determining the chances of an individual being ticketed for parking illegally.  The 
question is aimed at measuring an individual’s perception.  As noted earlier in this study, 
perception can be a key factor in an individual’s decision making process.   
Deterrence and rational choice were measured by examining certainty and 
severity of punishment.  One set of questions asked if the respondent had ever been given 
a ticket for illegally parking.  The following question asked if the respondent had parked 
illegally after being issued a ticket.  This is a measurement of classical specific 
deterrence.  Next, respondents were asked if they would illegally park if the fine was $25.  
The next question was exactly the same only the fine was increased to $150.  This is one 
of the ways severity of punishment was calculated.  Another question set examines 
severity of punishment as well.  Respondents were asked if they would park illegally to 






Following that set of questions was another set asking if they would park illegally if a 
police officer was watching them.  The fines were again listed at $25 and $150.  Also, the 
final exam period was brought into this set of questions since that is when parking 
pressures become extreme.  Many demographics were included in the study: gender, age, 
race, school classification (freshman, sophomore, etc.), major, employment status, 
commuter status (living on or off campus), and whether or not the student was an athlete. 
Statistics 
This study employed a three wave analysis of data.  The first wave of analysis 
included a frequency distribution of all variables and responses.  The second wave of 
analysis used a bivariate measure, cross tabulation.  Cross tabulation is a non-parametric 
test.  Even though the non-parametric test is not as powerful as the parametric test, the 
sample size suggests that the difference would be minimal.   
Chi-Square analysis was chosen to show statistical significance due to its 
sensitivity to data.  Even though Fisher’s Test gives the exact p-value, Chi-square was 
chosen because of the familiarity the researcher has with its functioning capacity.  Also, 
while Chi-Square cannot give an exact measure of p-value, it can give an approximation 
of p-value.  The sample size led the researcher towards Chi-Square as well.  The higher 
the sample size, the less need there is for an exact p-value.  Yates’ continuity correction is 
often used to make the Chi-Square p-value more accurate.  However, some argue that the 
correction can “over correct” or go too far.  Once again, the size of the sample ruled out 
the need for Fisher’s Test and Yates’ continuity correction. 
 The non parametric bivariate analysis did little to show the effect of several 






findings were somewhat limited.  Hence, the analysis progressed into the third and final 
wave, logistic regression.  Logistic regression served as the multivariate statistical 
measuring instrument.  Regression was chosen instead of correlation because many of the 
variables were presumed to cause a change in another variable.  Also, regression offered 
the option of manipulating the X variable.  OLS (linear regression) was not used due to 
three inherent difficulties.  Demaris (1995) says that the use of a linear function, the 
assumption of independence between the predictors and the error term, and non constant 
variance of the errors across combinations of predictor values make OLS a limited 
statistical method when using a binary 0 to 1 technique.  In addition, Bollen (1989) says 
the pseudo-isolation condition requires the error term to be uncorrelated with the 
predictor variables.  
 The researcher chose to have the predictor variables and the error term correlated 
in this study.  A researcher should not assume a relationship between variables even if the 
relationship makes sense theoretically.  When the reader glances at the data analysis 
section, he or she will see why this is a critical fact to note.  If the researcher had assumed 
a relationship between predictor variables, then the regression techniques would have 
been misleading.  The researcher chose to report the error term in all data analyses.  This 
helps the reader identify the margin of error in each unit of analysis.        
 Logistic regression is a popular technique employed in the field of social science 
due to its sensitivity to an abundance of integral data.  Given the nature of the 
questionnaire, logistic regression became the most obvious measurement tool.  Because 
the respondents were forced into dichotomous responses (yes and no) the dependent 






survey used in this study asked hypothetical questions and asked specifically about 
individuals’ perceptions of what he or she would do in certain situations.  Logistic 
regression seemed to be a natural fit for the third and final wave of analysis. 
Hypotheses 
 There were an abundance of potential hypotheses that could have been tested 
using the data collected for this sample.  After looking at all of the raw data, the 
researcher believed that these five hypotheses were the best options to test deterrence and 
rational choice theories simultaneously.  Also, for the purposes of length and time, these 
five hypotheses were chosen at this time: Hypothesis 1: The respondents who have been 
given a ticket will be less inclined to park illegally again.  Hypothesis 2: The respondents 
who perceive their chances of being ticketed high will park illegally less often than those 
who perceive their chances of getting a ticket low.  Offending is increased by perceptions 
of the opportunity to park illegally without being ticketed.  Hypothesis 3: Respondents 
who have never been given a ticket for illegally parking will be more likely to illegally 
park to get to their final exam when the fine is $25 than those who have been given an 
illegal parking ticket.  Hypothesis 4: More respondents will say that they would park 
illegally to get to class if the fine was $25 than if the fine was $150.  Hypothesis 5: More 
respondents will park illegally when a police officer is not watching them and the fine is 
$25 than if a police officer is watching them and the fine is $25. 
Describing Some of the Data 
One side note must be explained about the time period in which the survey was 
administered.  The survey was administered at the start of a new semester.  Parking 






available to many students at certain times of the day.  Two parking lots were under 
construction at the time of the survey.  One road was closed that was used for parking 
prior to the beginning of the new semester.  Also, enrollment increased to the highest 
level the university had ever achieved.  These unique situations combined with the 
historically misallocated parking slots/areas led to a potential threat to internal validity.  
These unique situations may have been beneficial to the overall response rate to the 
study.  Students wanted to talk about this hot topic at its most critical point.  In fact, some 
students took it upon themselves to make written remarks about the parking situation on 
campus.    
Limitations to the research design were observed.  If the sample were larger, it 
would better mirror the student population.  The respondents in the sample were not 
chosen randomly.  The sample was a convenience sample.  
The University of Memphis 
The University of Memphis is located in Memphis, Tennessee.  It is an urban 
institution for higher education.  The student population is estimated to be over 21,000 
students.  The University of Memphis is fully accredited by the Commission on Colleges 
of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.  The University of Memphis 
participates in many intercollegiate sports, most notably men’s basketball.  The university 
has approximately 3,000 residential students.  However, the university is largely 
comprised of commuter students.  The University of Memphis is governed by the 
Tennessee Board of Regents.   
The University of Memphis has a Parking Services Department.  Every vehicle 






the rearview mirror.  Vehicles must be parked within the area allotted by white lines on 
both sides.  Any vehicle violating these two policies will be fined and possibly towed at 
the expense of the owner.  There are 25 parking violations that the University of 
Memphis enforces with fines.  These violations can be assessed with fines ranging from 
























 The gender distribution for the survey (58.4% female to 41.6% male) closely 
resembled the University of Memphis student population (61% female to 39% male), 
(Common Data Set 2009-2010), and approximately 62% of students were of traditional 
college age (18-21).  Approximately 38% were non-traditional college age students (older 
than 21).  The racial breakdown was 55% Caucasian, 38.6% African American, 2.4% 
Latino, and 4% other.  The school classification breakdown was 18.8% freshman, 29.9% 
sophomore, 20.2% junior, 23% senior, and 8.1% graduate.  Approximately 49% of the 
respondents were criminal justice majors, and 51.5% were non-criminal justice majors.  
Approximately 65% of respondents reported that they were employed.  Approximately 
78% of those who were employed were part-time employees.  Almost 80% of 
respondents were commuter students.  Approximately 7% of the students were athletes.     
Summary of Theoretical Responses 
 About 71% of respondents reported that they had parked illegally before taking 
this survey.  Approximately 57% reported that they had parked illegally at the University 
of Memphis.  Approximately 53% of respondents have been given a ticket for illegally 
parking.  Of those who were given a ticket, approximately 62% have not parked illegally 
since the ticket was issued.  About 41% of respondents perceived their chances of getting 
a ticket low (0-30%), about 29% of respondents perceived their chances of getting a 
ticket moderate (31%-69%), and  30.3% of respondents perceived their chances of getting 






park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25.  Approximately 98% of respondents said 
that they would not park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150.  Approximately 
87% of respondents said that they would not park illegally to get to class if the fine was 
$25 and a police officer was watching.  About 98.4% of respondents said that they would 
not park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150 and a police officer was watching.  
Approximately 80% of respondents said that they would park illegally to get to their final 
exam if the fine was $25.  About 67.5% of respondents said that they would not park 
illegally to get to their final exam if the fine was $150.  Approximately 56% of 
respondents said that they would park illegally to get to their final exam if the fine was 
$25 and a police officer was watching.  Approximately 74% of respondents said that they 
would not park illegally to get to their final exam if the fine was $150 and a police officer 
was watching.         
Cross Tabulation of Hypotheses 
 The data gave no support for hypothesis 1.  Those who have been given a ticket 
are not less likely to park illegally again.  In fact, the data show that an individual who 
parks illegally once is more likely to park illegally again regardless of whether or not he 
or she was ticketed.  A Pearson Chi-Square value expressed the statistical significance of 
this finding: X² (1) = 190.419; p < .01. 
 The data gave no support for hypothesis 2.  Offending was not increased by 
perceptions of the opportunity to get away with parking illegally.  Those who perceived 
their chances of getting a ticket for illegally parking low actually parked illegally less 






Chi-Square value expressed the statistical significance of this finding: X² (1) = 18.613; p 
< .01.   
 The data gave no support for hypothesis 3.  Those who have never been given a 
ticket for parking illegally did not say that they would be more inclined to illegally park 
to get to a final exam if the fine is $25.  Those who have been exposed to the specific 
deterrent (illegal parking ticket) showed no significant difference in their decision to 
illegally park when compared to those who have been privy to only general deterrence.  
This finding was not statistically significant: X² (1) = 1.725; p > .05. 
 The data supported hypothesis 4.  Approximately 42.6% of respondents said that 
they would park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25.  Only 2.2% of respondents 
said that they would park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150.  X² (1) = 10.745; p 
< .01.   
 The data supported hypothesis 5.  Approximately 42.6% of respondents said that 
they would park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25.  About 12.7% of respondents 
said that they would park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25 and a police officer 
was watching them.  Of the respondents who said that they would park illegally to get to 
class if the fine was $25, 29.3% would also park illegally to get to class if the police were 
watching.  Therefore, approximately 70% of respondents said that a police officer 
watching them would deter them from parking illegally if the fine was $25.  A Pearson 









Binary Logistic Regression Techniques 
 To control for several variables at once, binary logistic regression was used to 
show saliency with the dependent variables.  Each technique has been labeled with a 
number so that there is a distinction made evident for discussion and clarification 
purposes of the different regressions.  The first (1) binary logistic regression analysis was 




Variables in the Equation 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a Gender .540 .226 5.692 1 .017 1.715 1.101 2.672 
Age -.727 .277 6.899 1 .009 .484 .281 .832 
Race -.011 .224 .002 1 .961 .989 .638 1.534 
Classification .280 .106 6.964 1 .008 1.324 1.075 1.630 
Major -.141 .221 .404 1 .525 .869 .563 1.340 
Employed .601 .211 8.096 1 .004 1.823 1.206 2.758 
Constant .184 .441 .174 1 .676 1.202   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Age, Race, Classification, Major, Employed. 
 
 
All of the demographic variables were controlled for.  Employment status 
registered with the highest significance level of .004.  B (Beta) was measured at .601 
indicating that those who were employed were more likely to illegally park.  As visible 
by the chart, age, classification, and employment were all statistically significant too.  






Lower classmen (Freshman and Sophomores) were more likely to park illegally than 
upper classmen.  Interestingly enough, a B value of -.727 indicated that individuals age 
22 and up were more likely to illegally park than individuals who were between 18 and 
21.  The B value for gender (.540) indicated that males were far more likely to park 
illegally than females.  
The second regression (2) was controlling for several variables in response to the 
question “Have you ever parked illegally at the University of Memphis?”  Here is the 
output table: 
Table 2 
     
 
In this output calculation, race, classification, and employment status were 
statistically significant.  School classification had the highest level of significance (.000).  
Variables in the Equation 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a Gender .247 .205 1.449 1 .229 1.281 .856 1.915
Age -.038 .238 .026 1 .872 .962 .604 1.533
Race -.502 .203 6.113 1 .013 .606 .407 .901
Classification .354 .095 13.854 1 .000 1.425 1.182 1.716
Major -.079 .200 .157 1 .692 .924 .625 1.366
Employed .393 .199 3.898 1 .048 1.481 1.003 2.188
Doyouliveoncampus -.100 .241 .174 1 .677 .905 .564 1.450
StudentAthlete -.067 .394 .029 1 .866 .935 .432 2.025
Constant -.536 .891 .362 1 .548 .585   







A B value of .354 indicated that lower classmen were much more likely to illegally park 
at the University of Memphis than upper classmen.  The B value of -.502 indicated that 
non-whites were more likely to park illegally at the University of Memphis than whites.  
Lastly, employment status again was significantly correlated with parking illegally at the 
University of Memphis.  The B value of .393 showed that those who were employed were 
more likely to park illegally at the University of Memphis than those who were not 
working.  The Nagelkerke R Square registered the explanation of variance at 
approximately 10%. 
The third regression (3) was performed on the question “Have you ever been 




Variables in the Equation 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a Gender -.060 .213 .080 1 .778 .942 .621 1.429
Age -.196 .242 .657 1 .418 .822 .511 1.321
Race -.949 .213 19.954 1 .000 .387 .255 .587
Classification .491 .099 24.560 1 .000 1.633 1.345 1.983
Major -.109 .207 .278 1 .598 .896 .597 1.346
Employed .521 .210 6.143 1 .013 1.684 1.115 2.543
Doyouliveoncampus -.146 .254 .331 1 .565 .864 .526 1.421
StudentAthlete -.967 .427 5.134 1 .023 .380 .165 .878
Constant 1.086 .947 1.315 1 .251 2.961   







 School classification and race were the two most significant variables correlated 
with this question (.000).  A B value of .491 indicated that upper classmen received more 
tickets for illegal parking then under classmen did.  A B value of -.949 showed that non-
whites received tickets for illegal parking much more frequently than whites.  People who 
were employed received tickets more frequently than people who were not employed.  
Lastly, student athletes received tickets for parking illegally much more often than non 
student athletes (B value of -.967).  This statistic was unique in the fact that there was a 
lot of anecdotal animosity from university staff that student athletes never get ticketed for 
illegal parking.  These data prove otherwise at least within this sample.  The Nagelkerke 
R Square registered the explanation of variance at approximately 21%. 
 The fourth regression technique (4) was run with the dependent variable being 


















     
 
 The most significant variable in this regression was classification (.000).  A -.536 
B value showed that upper classmen continued to park illegally after being ticketed at a 
much higher rate than under classmen.  In fact, approximately 91% of freshmen who had 
been given a ticket in the past reported that they had refrained from parking illegally 
again.  Employment status was significant (.004).  A .636 B value indicated that those 
who were employed parked illegally more often after receiving a ticket than those who 
did not work.  Race was a statistically significant factor (.013).  A -.536 B value showed 
that non-whites were more inclined to park illegally after being ticketed than whites.  A B 
value of -.832 expressed that student athletes were more likely to park illegally after 
Variables in the Equation 
 
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for EXP(B) 
Lower Upper 
Step 1a Gender .398 .220 3.272 1 .070 1.488 .967 2.290
Age .011 .255 .002 1 .967 1.011 .613 1.668
Race -.536 .216 6.133 1 .013 .585 .383 .894
Classification .412 .105 15.341 1 .000 1.509 1.228 1.855
Major -.156 .215 .523 1 .470 .856 .561 1.305
Employed .636 .223 8.112 1 .004 1.889 1.219 2.926
Doyouliveoncampus -.415 .280 2.195 1 .138 .660 .381 1.143
StudentAthlete -.832 .413 4.071 1 .044 .435 .194 .976
Constant -.224 .940 .057 1 .812 .800   







being ticketed than non student athletes.  The Nagelkerke R Square registered the 
explanation of variance at approximately 15%. 
A fifth regression technique (5) was recorded.  The dependent variable tested was  
“Would you park illegally to get to your final exam if the fine was $25?”  More tables 
can be found in the Appendices.   
Race was a significant factor (.000).  A .902 B value expressed that whites were 
more inclined to illegally park to get to a final exam when the fine is $25 than non-
whites.  Perceived chances of getting a ticket was a significant factor as well (.005).  In a 
complete counter to rational choice theory, a B value of .418 indicated that as the 
perception of getting a ticket increased so did the likelihood of parking illegally to get to 
a final exam when the fine was $25.  
A number of other binary logistic regression techniques were run testing other 
dependent variables but the explanation of variances among responses was so low they 
















Results of Hypothesis 1 
 Because the severity of punishment is seemingly so low, respondents who were 
more inclined to park illegally did not seem to take into account the $25 fine.  This 
examination of deterrence and rational choice theory should not serve as a negation of the 
theories.  Hypothesis 1 primarily is testing specific deterrence.  However, the $25 fine is 
apparently not a threshold for the majority of respondents to be deterred from illegally 
parking to get to class. 
 When the severity of punishment is increased ($150), respondents who have been 
given a ticket before are less likely to park illegally (96.6%).  However, when these two 
variables are cross tabulated there is no statistical significance between the perceived 
offending patterns.  Those who have been given a ticket for illegal parking have 
approximately the same perceived offending patterns that those who have never been 
given a ticket for illegal parking. 
Results of Hypothesis 2 
 Even though prior research suggests otherwise, perceived chances of getting 
caught did not appear to be relevant in this study.  This could possibly be explained by 
the level of punishment.  Because the fine is only $25, respondents seemed to not really 
care about their chances of getting a ticket when choosing to illegally park.  In addition, 







 Another factor could be at work here as well.  Those who perceive a low chance 
of getting a ticket may have never received a ticket.  Therefore, some of those 
respondents may not park illegally at any rate.  Those who perceive their chances of 
getting ticketed as being high may have been given a ticket or multiple tickets in the past.  
Some of these respondents may not have been deterred.  Therefore, even though they 
perceive their chances of getting a ticket high, they do not care because the severity of the 
punishment does not correlate with the certainty of punishment. 
Results of Hypothesis 3 
Once again, a principle of rational choice theory (prior experiences with offending 
and punishment tendencies) does not seem to have a significant effect in the respondents’ 
decision making process.  This hypothesis was testing the two types of deterrence as well, 
specific and general.  It was thought that those who have been ticketed would be less 
likely to reoffend.  This was not the case.  There could be many explanations for this 
finding.   
First, the hypothesis assumed that there would be future criminality without prior 
criminality or being punished for prior criminality.  This study has brought an interesting 
finding to the author’s attention.  Some individuals may be just more likely to offend and 
reoffend based on factors not always associated with a rational choice decision making 
process. 
Secondly, the question was posed in a way to include getting to a final exam.  
Some respondents (in this case, students) hear “final exam” and there seems to be a 
psychological trigger hit.  Students appear to show a common bond or agreement in the 






advertently reverses the common theoretical basis of deterrence and rational choice.  This 
question does not pose an increase to severity or certainty of punishment.  Rather it is an 
examination of conditions or circumstances: under which conditions are people more 
likely to offend?  Apparently, getting to a final exam is a common circumstance that 
these respondents shared in which offending was seen as highly necessary or likely. 
Lastly, the fine was only $25.  When a cross tabulation is run comparing those 
who have been given a ticket with whether or not a person would park illegally to get to a 
final exam if the fine was $150, there was a noticeable difference in the responses.  
Approximately 78% of those who have never been given a ticket said that they would 
park illegally to get to their final exam if the fine was $25.  When the fine increased to 
$150, the percentage dropped to approximately 30%.  The difference between those who 
have received a ticket and those who have not received a ticket was not statistically 
significant.  A Pearson Chi-Square value showed  
X²(1) = 1.434; p > .05. 
Results of Hypothesis 4 and 5 
 Hypothesis 4 and 5 were central in testing classical deterrence theory.  Hypothesis 
4 showed strong support for deterrence theory, specifically the effect of severity of 
punishment.  As the severity of punishment increased, the respondents’ perception of 
their likelihood of offending decreased.  Money (fines) seemed to have a real impact on 
most students’ cost/benefit analysis.          
 The results from testing hypothesis 5 brought one of the main principles of 
deterrence theory to light, certainty of punishment.  Respondents were not as willing to 






has been used as a deterrent for many years.  This finding shows some support for that 
theory. 
Conclusions and Implications 
 One goal of research is to contribute to the existing knowledge base.  The instant 
research focused on an integrated approach using two popular classical theories.  Given 
the findings, this research does help to fill the gap in the literature on criminological 
theory.  In particular, this research demonstrates the value of integrating theories.   
Integrated approaches are becoming more common and this research is a prime 
example of the benefits that come from researching with two theories rather than just one.  
If this research had just been testing deterrence theory, the data would not have been able 
to quantify respondents’ perceptions about their chances of getting a ticket.  Also, if this 
research had just been testing rational choice theory, then certainty and severity of 
punishment would not have come into play.  Obviously, to gain the level of 
“explainability” that a researcher desires, it is important to employ as many theories and 
variables as possible. 
 The revitalization of deterrence theory was highlighted throughout this research.  
There is some research being done using classical criminology that is useful and it should 
not be discarded as old notions.  Just because something is old does not mean that it 
cannot be applicable today.  While rational choice theory needed no extra assistance in 
contemporary popularity, this research examined a unique postulate of rational choice 
theory, perceptions.  While cost/benefit analysis is still the most common aspect of 
rational choice theory researched, for a theory to grow, all of its postulates must be 






One of the most interesting findings in this study was related to the questions 
pertaining to a final exam.  A large portion of this research has dealt with perception 
being just as important as actuality.  Students’ perceptions about their final exams were 
quite influential in their decision making processes on the survey.  Even when a police 
officer was watching the respondent, the respondents reported that they were more likely 
to offend (illegally park) if they had to get to their final exam.     
Perceived certainty and severity of punishment seemed to affect individuals’ 
rational assumptions about their potential behavior.  However, one interesting finding 
from this study showed that perception and reality are different.  Those who have actually 
been punished before were not more inclined to conform (most of those who had received 
an illegal parking ticket still continued to illegally park).  However, when the questions 
were posed about an individual’s perception about offending, most respondents showed 
that they would be more likely to conform as their chances of getting a ticket increased 
(police officer watching them illegally park).  In addition, those who perceived their 
chances of getting a ticket high were not less likely to offend than those who perceived 
their chances low.   
 Consequently, future research should delve further into this finding.  This finding 
is exactly opposite of what rational choice theory dictates.  Perhaps the fine should 
fluctuate a little less between the survey questions.  Maybe the jump between $25 and 
$150 was so drastic that it altered the respondent’s decision making on the survey.  
College students normally do not have a lot of money.  Therefore, a questions pertaining 






In the future, extra variables should be included as well.  This researcher was 
trying to keep the survey as short as possible to assist in keeping the response rate high.  
However, in doing so, this study potentially missed out on a large sum of data that could 
have contributed to the variance in responses.  For example, one question asked 
respondents about their employment status (part-time, full-time, or not working).  Maybe 
the survey should have included a question about the respondent’s income category (less 
than $20,000, $20,000-$40,000, etc…).  This addition to the survey alone would have 
potentially explained the differences in responses between people who were poor, middle 
class, and wealthy.   
It should be noted that any attempt to duplicate this research should follow the 
same theoretical framework used in this study.  Deterrence theory is hard to measure.  
The measurement of behavior that has the capability to actually be deterred is only 
measuring an individuals’ perception of what he or she might do in a particular situation.  
In addition, rational choice theory must be examined so that a true cost/benefit analysis 
can be measured.  This is the researcher’s explaining power potential.  Perception versus 
reality will always give different output statements.  The key is to be consistent with what 
you are measuring (internal validity).  In this case, it is difficult to measure deterrence.  
Therefore, rational choice theory has to be utilized in order to have a valid unit of 
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I invite you to participate in a research project that will be conducted by graduate 
student Brad Poole.  The study is titled, “An Integrated Approach between Deterrence 
and Rational Choice Theory.”  The survey will take approximately 5 minutes or less to 
complete.  This research will serve as a component towards completion of my graduate 
thesis. 
Attached you will find the brief survey I am asking you to complete.  Your 
responses will remain completely anonymous.  Please do not place your name or any 
other information that could be used to identify you on this survey. 
Your participation in this survey will result in no compensation nor have an effect 
on your grade in this class.  You may choose not to take this survey.  Additionally, you 
may choose to take the survey but not answer all the questions.  There are no anticipated 
physical, psychological, social, legal or other associated risks to stem from this survey. 
I greatly appreciate your participation.  If you have any questions or concerns, 
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KB Turner, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor and Graduate Coordinator 
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The University of Memphis 
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For answers to questions regarding the research subjects’ rights, the Chair of the 





































“An Integrated Approach between Deterrence and Rational Choice Theory” 
 
1. Gender:           Male___          Female___ 
2. Age___ 
3. Race:  Caucasian___  African American___  Latino___ Asian___ Native 
American___ Other___ 
4. Classification: Freshman___   Sophomore___   Junior___   Senior___   
Graduate/Law___ 
5. Major __________________________________________ 
6. Are you employed?                                                                                    Yes___     
No___                     Full-time___        Part-time___ 
7. Do you live on campus?                                                                             Yes___     
No___ 
8. Are you a student athlete?                                                                          Yes___     
No___   
If yes, what sport? _____________________ 
9. Have you ever parked illegally?                                                                Yes___     
No___ 
10. Have you ever parked illegally at the University of Memphis?                Yes___     
No___ 
11. Have you ever been given a ticket for illegally parking?                          Yes___     
No___ 
12. After receiving a ticket, have you parked illegally again?                        Yes___     
No___ 
13. What do you perceive the chances are of you receiving a ticket for parking 
illegally at the University of Memphis? ___% 







15. Would you park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150?                  Yes___     
No___ 
16. Would you park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25 and a police officer 
was watching you?                                                                                            
Yes___     No___ 
17. Would you park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150 and a police officer 
was watching you?                                                                                            
Yes___     No___ 
18. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam if the fine was $25?        Yes___     
No___ 
19. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam if the fine was $150?      Yes___     
No___ 
20. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam if the fine was $25 and a police 
officer was watching you?                                                                                     
Yes___     No___ 
21. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam if the fine was $150 and a police 
officer was watching you?                                                                                     

























1. Gender:                                   Male=1          Female=2 
2. Age:                                             number in years 
3. Race:      Caucasian=1    African American=2     Latino=3    Asian=4     Native American=5     
Other=6 
4. Classification:    Freshman=1   Sophomore=2   Junior=3   Senior=4   Graduate/law=5 
5. Major:                                     degree student is seeking 
6. Employed:                                       yes=1   no=2 
7. Part or Full:                    part=1   full=2                  no answer=8 
8. Do you live on campus:                 yes=1   no=2 
9. Student athlete:                              yes=1   no=2 
10. What sport:                  sport student plays           no answer=8 
11. Have you ever parked illegally:    yes=1   no=2 
12. Have you ever parked illegally at the U of M:   yes=1   no=2 
13. Have you ever been given a ticket for illegally parking:   yes=1   no=2 
14. Have you parked illegally again:   yes=1   no=2               no answer=8 
15. Chances of receiving a ticket:        percentage points %         no answered=8 
16. Would you park illegally for $25:   yes=1   no=2 
17. Would you park illegally for $150:                yes=1     no=2 
18. Would you park illegally for $25 if police were watching:   yes=1   no=2 
19. Would you park illegally for $150 if police were watching:   yes=1   no=2 
20. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam for $25:   yes=1   no=2 
21. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam for $150:   yes=1   no=2 
22. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam for $25 if police were watching:  
                                                         yes=1   no=2 
23. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam for $150 if police were watching:   











 Gender Age Race Classification Major Employed PartorFull 
N Valid 505 505 505 505 505 505 330












Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid male 210 41.6 41.6 41.6 
female 295 58.4 58.4 100.0 





Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Traditional College Age 315 62.4 62.4 62.4
Non-traditional College Age 190 37.6 37.6 100.0




























Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 328 65.0 65.0 65.0 
no 176 34.9 34.9 99.8 
3.00 1 .2 .2 100.0 







Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid caucasian 278 55.0 55.0 55.0 
african american 195 38.6 38.6 93.7 
latino 12 2.4 2.4 96.0 
asian 4 .8 .8 96.8 
native american 1 .2 .2 97.0 
other 15 3.0 3.0 100.0 
Total 505 100.0 100.0  
Classification 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid freshman 95 18.8 18.8 18.8 
sophomore 151 29.9 29.9 48.7 
junior 102 20.2 20.2 68.9 
senior 116 23.0 23.0 91.9 
graduate/law 41 8.1 8.1 100.0 






Part or Full 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid part 258 51.1 78.2 78.2 
full 72 14.3 21.8 100.0 
Total 330 65.3 100.0  
Missing 8.00 175 34.7   
Total 505 100.0   
 
 
Do you live on campus 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 105 20.8 20.8 20.8 
no 398 78.8 78.8 99.6 
not answered 2 .4 .4 100.0 







Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 33 6.5 6.5 6.5 
no 472 93.5 93.5 100.0 














Frequencies of Theoretical Responses 
 
Have you ever parked illegally 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 361 71.5 71.5 71.5 
no 144 28.5 28.5 100.0 
Total 505 100.0 100.0  
 
Have you ever parked illegally at the u of m 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 288 57.0 57.0 57.0 
no 217 43.0 43.0 100.0 
Total 505 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Have you ever been given a ticket for illegally parking 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 267 52.9 52.9 52.9 
no 238 47.1 47.1 100.0 
Total 505 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Have you parked illegally again 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 178 35.2 37.9 37.9 
no 292 57.8 62.1 100.0 
Total 470 93.1 100.0  
Missing 8.00 35 6.9   









Chances of getting a ticket 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid low 200 39.6 41.0 41.0 
moderate 140 27.7 28.7 69.7 
high 148 29.3 30.3 100.0 
Total 488 96.6 100.0  
Missing no answer 17 3.4   
Total 505 100.0   
 
Would you park illegally for 25 dollars 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 215 42.6 42.6 42.6 
no 290 57.4 57.4 100.0 
Total 505 100.0 100.0  
 
 
One hundred fifty dollars 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 11 2.2 2.2 2.2 
no 494 97.8 97.8 100.0 
Total 505 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Twenty five dollars and police 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 64 12.7 12.7 12.7 
no 441 87.3 87.3 100.0 









One fifty and police 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 8 1.6 1.6 1.6 
no 497 98.4 98.4 100.0 





Final exam 25 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 405 80.2 80.2 80.2 
no 100 19.8 19.8 100.0 
Total 505 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Final exam 150 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 164 32.5 32.5 32.5 
no 341 67.5 67.5 100.0 
Total 505 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Final exam 25 and police 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 283 56.0 56.0 56.0 
no 222 44.0 44.0 100.0 








Final exam 150 and police 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid yes 130 25.7 25.7 25.7 
no 375 74.3 74.3 100.0 



























































Pearson Chi-Square 190.419a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 187.779 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 230.304 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
190.014 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 470     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 76.88. 
























46.0% 65.7% 65.5% 57.6%




54.0% 34.3% 34.5% 42.4%














Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillegallyparking * finalexam25 Crosstabulation 
 finalexam25 
Total yes no 
Haveyoueverbeengivenatick
etforillegallyparking 
yes Count 220 47 267
% within finalexam25 54.3% 47.0% 52.9%
no Count 185 53 238
% within finalexam25 45.7% 53.0% 47.1%
Total Count 405 100 505







Pearson Chi-Square 18.613a 2 .000
Likelihood Ratio 18.619 2 .000
Linear-by-Linear Association 14.567 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 488   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected 


















Pearson Chi-Square 1.725a 1 .189   
Continuity Correctionb 1.444 1 .230   
Likelihood Ratio 1.722 1 .189   
Fisher's Exact Test    .219 .115
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.722 1 .189   
N of Valid Cases 505     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 47.13. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 























































































Pearson Chi-Square 93.547a 1 .000   
Continuity Correctionb 90.949 1 .000   
Likelihood Ratio 110.513 1 .000   
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
93.362 1 .000   
N of Valid Cases 505     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.25. 

































% within onehundredfiftydollars 18.2% 47.8% 47.1
%





















Pearson Chi-Square 3.781a 1 .052   
Continuity Correctionb 2.687 1 .101   
Likelihood Ratio 4.132 1 .042   
Fisher's Exact Test    .067 .047
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.774 1 .052   
N of Valid Cases 505     

















Pearson Chi-Square 3.781a 1 .052   
Continuity Correctionb 2.687 1 .101   
Likelihood Ratio 4.132 1 .042   
Fisher's Exact Test    .067 .047
Linear-by-Linear Association 3.774 1 .052   
N of Valid Cases 505     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.18. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 









































































Pearson Chi-Square 1.434a 1 .231   
Continuity Correctionb 1.215 1 .270   
Likelihood Ratio 1.438 1 .231   
Fisher's Exact Test    .254 .135
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.431 1 .232   
N of Valid Cases 505     
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 77.29. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
 
 

